Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
H ealth care reform proposals that rely on market allocation of resources generally contain several key elements: improved consumer information, consumer choice among competing health plans, and consumer exposure to differences in the prices of competing health plans. A typical market-based prescription consists of annual open enrollment periods with good information on competing plans, and a requirement that consumers pay the marginal cost of more expensive plans (Enthoven, 1988 (Enthoven, , 1990 Dowd, et. al., 1992; Dowd, Feldman, and Christianson, 1996) . Market-based proposals rely on the assumption that competitive pressure, created by consumer choice, will induce health plans to adjust both their costs and their premiums to efficient levels.
The premium-price elasticity of health plan choice is a key element in the theory of price competition among health plans. Several studies (Feldman, et. al., 1989; Feldman, 1994/1995; found that consumers' choice of health plans is significantly and negatively related to out-of-pocket premiums. However, the design and tax treatment of employee benefits may reduce substantially the consumer's sensitivity to premium differences, resulting in inefficient choices and reduced competitiveness of the health insurance market in firms that offer multiple health plans to their employees.
Generally, the exemption of health insurance premiums from personal income and FICA taxes is unpopular among health economists. For example, Pauly and Goodman (1995) argue that the current tax law favors health insurance over taxable wages, health insurance purchased through one's employer versus health insurance purchased directly by the consumer, and health care financed by insurance versus health care purchased out-of-pocket. These distorted prices lead to inefficiencies in the demand for health insurance, the supply of labor to firms, and the demand for covered versus uncovered medical services (e.g., services obtained from conventional versus alternative care providers). Because these subsidies increase with the consumer's tax rate, and thus increase with income, Pauly and Goodman argue that the exemption is regressive, as well as inefficient.
Two types of tax exemptions for health expenditures are covered under Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code. The first, which is the focus of this study, is the exemption of both the employer's and employee's premium contributions from federal personal income taxes and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes (Beam, 1992; Borleis, 1992) . 1 In firms offering Section 125, the employee-paid portion of the health insurance premium often is deducted automatically from the employee's paycheck prior to computing the employee's taxes.
The second tax exemption under Section 125 is for spending on health care services under flexible spending accounts (FSAs). FSAs allow employees to allocate a fixed amount of tax-exempt income to a health care expense account at the beginning of the calendar year. The FSA funds are used to pay for eligible out-ofpocket medical expenses, which include coinsurance, deductibles, balance bills, and other medical expenses that are not covered by the employee's health plan.
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FSAs often are confused with cafeteria benefits. The term "cafeteria benefits" refers to a fixed amount of compensation that an employee can allocate across several fringe benefits, including different types of health insurance coverage, and in some cases, taxable wages, as well.
Our analysis focuses exclusively on the first exemption offered under Section 125 -employee out-of-pocket premiums. Specifically, we examine the effect of taxexempt employee out-of-pocket premiums on the price elasticity of demand for health plans offered by a firm. Wiatrowski (1995) estimated that in 1993, about one-third of full-time employees in midto-large sized business establishments had access to tax-exempt out-of-pocket premiums under Section 125. Seventyfive percent of the large public employers (city and county governments) in the 1994 national sample used for this study offered Section 125.
The predicted effect of Section 125 on health plan choice can be illustrated with a simple example. Suppose a consumer makes $60,000 per year and pays a 40 percent marginal income tax rate, including state and local income taxes. The consumer is offered two health plans: one has a total annual premium of $6,000; the other costs $5,000. If the employer's premium contribution is set at $5,000, the consumer who chooses the $6,000 plan must pay the $1,000 out-of-pocket. Without Section 125, the consumer's after-tax income is reduced by $1,000 if the $6,000 plan is chosen. With Section 125, the ad-1 Economic theory holds that in competitive markets, employee compensation equals the employee's marginal revenue product. According to this theory there really is no "employer" contribution to premiums. Any premium paid by the employer is deducted, on average, from the employee's total compensation. It is not clear, however, that at the individual employee level, wages always adjust to account for more expensive health insurance choices. For a more complete discussion see Dowd and Feldman (1998) . 2 Eligible medical care expenses are defined by Section 213(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. Eligible expenses include payments for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or treatment affecting any part or function of the body. They also include insulin, medicines, and drugs requiring a prescription.
ditional $1,000 premium for the $6,000 plan is untaxed, saving the consumer .4 × $1,000 or $400. The consumer's after tax net price of the more expensive plan is reduced from $1,000 to $600. Section 125 thus reduces the consumer's after-tax premium differential between the two plans by a percentage equal to the consumer's marginal tax rate. This reduction in the relative after-tax cost of the high-priced plan could produce an inefficiently high level of demand for high-priced plans, and reduce the pressure on health plans to keep premiums close to their costs. Whether this outcome occurs or not depends on whether the consumer pays attention to the effect of taxes when comparing the prices of competing health plans.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a substantial literature on consumer choice of health plans (Scanlon, et. al., 1997) . Holmer (1984) estimated the price elasticity of demand for four health plans offered to federal employees. Variation in employes' marginal tax rates served as a proxy for variation in the outof-pocket price of insurance. The average price elasticity of demand for health insurance was estimated to be -0.16, but this estimate may be biased toward zero because the proxy price variable contained measurement error from unobserved health plan choices and prices facing particular families (Pauly, 1986; Marquis and Long, 1995) . Welch (1986) improved upon Holmer's study by using a more precise price measure based on a national sample of firms that gave employees a choice of health plans. However, the analysis was restricted to employee choice between one fee-for-service (FFS) plan and one prepaid group practice (PGP). The limitation of choice to two plans does not use all the information available in firms where more than two plans were offered. This is likely to result in estimates of the price elasticity that are too small, as in Holmer's (1984) study. Short and Taylor (1989) avoided these methodological limitations by measuring out-of-pocket premiums for employees with two sets of options: two FFS plans; and one FFS plan and one health maintenance organization (HMO). Using data from the 1977 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey, Short and Taylor estimated the own-price elasticity of demand for HMO plans to be -4.5. While this research supports Welch's earlier estimates, the authors acknowledge the limitations of using 1977 data and not controlling for "other endogenous decisions in the full model," such as coinsurance and deductibles.
Using 1984 data from 17 Twin Cities firms, Feldman, et. al. (1989) estimated out-of-pocket premium elasticities of health plan choice. Unlike previous studies, they were able to construct the correct and complete choice set for each individual in the data. Only single employees without dependents were included in the single-coverage choice equation. Employees with coverage available through spouses were omitted from the family coverage sample. Feldman, et. al. found that a $5 premium increase (in 1984 dollars) for a health plan that enrolled 50 percent of the single employees in a given firm would decrease the enrollment share of that plan by 15 percentage points. The loss in enrollment was smaller among plans of different types (i.e., those with broad provider networks and few restrictions on access to specialists versus those with smaller networks and more restrictions) than among plans of the same type. Feldman (1994/1995) estimated a model of health plan choice using data for five Twin Cities employers from 1988 to 1993. All five firms offered multiple health plans. A grouped logit model was used to estimate the effect of out-of-pocket premiums on the plans' enrollment shares in the five firms. The out-of-pocket premium-price elasticity of health plan choice was estimated to be approximately -1.67.
3 This translates into a drop of 14 percentage points in enrollment from a $5 premium increase for a plan with 50 percent of the single-coverage employees initially. These results are similar to the earlier estimates by Feldman, et. al. (1989) , based on data from the same metropolitan area. Neither Feldman, et. al., (1989) nor Feldman (1994/1995) included the effect of tax-exempt out-of-pocket premiums in their analyses. Buchmueller and Feldstein (1997) analyzed the health plan switching that occurred from a natural experiment when the University of California changed its premium contribution policy in 1994. The new policy changed the employer contribution from one that paid part of any premium greater than the low-cost premium, to one that paid only the cost of the least expensive health plan. Under this natural experiment, employees directly faced the cost differential from choosing more expensive coverage. This policy change was consistent with the market-based model described above.
Significant health plan switching occurred when the new policy became effective. As expected, more expensive health plans experienced significant losses in market share. Although no price elasticity estimates are provided, the effect of premium changes on health plan switching is illustrated with a predictive example: a $10 premium increase would result in a five-fold increase in health plan switching, compared to switching that occurred before the low-cost contribution policy was implemented. Buchmueller and Feldstein also found that most switchers chose plans similar to their original plan, which supports the findings of Feldman, et. al. (1989) . Cutler and Reber (1998) analyzed data on Harvard University employees from the mid-1990s. Harvard changed from a premium contribution method that subsidized higher priced plans to a level dollar contribution method. Cutler and Reber's estimate of the price-elasticity of choice of more generous coverage was -2.
To our knowledge, only one previous study provides any empirical evidence on the effects of Section 125. Royalty and Solomon (1999) estimated out-of-pocket premium-price elasticities of health plan choice for Stanford University enrollees, using data from 1993 to 1995. Stanford employees can pay out-of-pocket premiums with pre-tax dollars, and employees face different marginal tax rates. The authors compared premium price elasticities based on premiums not adjusted for taxes to elasticities based on tax-adjusted premiums and found that the elasticities differ by the amount that one would expect if employees were taking the effect of taxes into account.
Our contribution to this literature is to provide a direct test of the effect of Section 125 on the sensitivity of health plan choice to out-of-pocket premiums. Unlike Royalty and Solomon, our data include employers that do and do not offer Section 125. Self-selection of employers into the group that offers Section 125 creates a potential bias in our study, which we address in the section on methods. Following the analysis of Feldman (1994/1995) , we estimate equations for the market shares of health plans offered by these employers as a function of the employee's out-of-pocket premium, levels of coverages, and other variables. Our hypothesis is that consumers take the tax effect into account when choosing health plans. We construct two empirical tests of that hypothesis.
DATA
Our data are taken from a 1994 survey of large U.S. city and county governments that represent more than 100,000 people. Public sector employers were chosen for two reasons:
(1) Public employers are more likely than private companies to offer a standard set of health plans to all employees. Benefits offered in private firms are more likely to vary for union and non-union employees, salaried versus hourly employees, and other strata. In addition, private companies often have multiple establishments, each with a different set of benefits. (2) In a state-wide survey of Minnesota employers, Feldman, Griffin, and Dowd (1993) found that public employers were more likely to respond to a complex survey that is required to obtain the information needed for a study of health plan choice.
The data, collected by telephone survey between June, 1994, and January, 1995, represent the employer's 1994 experience with health plans. Employers were asked to provide information about employee demographics, health insurance purchasing practices, and health plan characteristics including the number and type of health plans offered. Employers also were asked whether they offered employees the opportunity to pay out-of-pocket premiums with tax-exempt dollars.
According to the 1990 Census, 658 cities and counties had populations greater than 100,000. These public employers comprised the universe for our study. We obtained responses from 563 cities and counties. Eighty-one of the 563 employers belonged to health insurance purchasing cooperatives (HIPCs) or pools and thus were excluded from the sample. 4 One hundred and sixty four employers offered only one health plan, rendering market share analyses meaningless. Approximately three-quarters (235) of the 318 employers in the final sample offered taxexempt out-of-pocket premiums under Section 125. Missing premium or enrollment data resulted in the loss of an additional seven employers for single coverage health plans and 14 employers for the family coverage plans. The remaining employers offered a total of 998 single coverage health plans and 973 family coverage plans. Further plan exclusions required by the conditional logit model are described in the next section.
Health plans were divided into four types: fee for-service (FFS), health maintenance organization (HMO), point-ofservice (POS) HMO (an HMO that provides some coverage of services obtained from out-of-network providers), and preferred provider organization (PPO). Coverage was divided into two tiers-single coverage and family coverage with unlimited dependents. Although employers could offer other types of coverage (such as single plus one dependent), the "single" and "family" coverage tiers contain the majority of all employees.
METHODS
Our model of employee behavior is based on the assumption that employees choose a health plan by comparing the expected utility from each plan offered by their employer and by picking the plan with the highest expected utility. Utility is derived from health plan characteristics such as breadth and depth of coverage and the premium. As in earlier studies by Feldman, et. al. (1989) and Feldman (1994/1995) , the premium variable in this study is the employee's out-of-pocket premium, rather than the total premium.
Our statistical analysis uses a grouped version of McFadden's (1973) conditional logit model. The probability that the j th health plan is chosen from a set of M different health plans offered to employees is:
From this expression, it follows that:
[2]
By equating P j to the probability of choosing the j th plan in a sample of employees of the i th employer, P j becomes the market share of the j th plan (MS j ). Allowing for stochastic error in the determination of the j th plan's market share in the i th employer, we arrive at the estimated market share equation:
[3]
We construct the dependent variable by forming the ratio of the market share of the j th plan to a k th reference plan for each employer. In theory, any plan could serve as the reference plan, but in this analysis, as in our previous work Feldman, 1994/1995) , we chose the lowest priced plan as the reference plan.
The explanatory variables are expressed as differences between characteristics of the j th plan and the lowest cost plan. For example, if the out-of-pocket premium for the j th single coverage plan is $30 per month and the out-of-pocket premium for the lowest-cost single coverage plan offered by that employer is $20 per month, the out-of-pocket premium difference would be $10 for this observation. We refer to this new variable (X j -X k ) as the relative out-of-pocket premium (RLTVPREM). A negative coefficient on the relative out-of-pocket premium, for example, implies that an increase in the premium of the j th plan relative to the lowest cost plan is associated with a decrease in the probability of choosing the j th plan relative to the lowest cost plan.
The lowest cost plan is identified separately for single and family coverage plans. The low-cost plans are excluded from the analysis, because all of the explanatory variables, which are expressed relative to the low-cost plan, are zero for that plan. When the lowest out-of-pocket premium is shared by two or more plans, RLTVPREM is zero for all the low cost plans. Because RLTVPREM is zero for those plans, they cannot be used to test the hypothesis that Section 125 modifies the price elasticity of health plan choice, and they also are excluded from the analysis. The final sample size was 318 single coverage and 437 family coverage plans.
The effect of the relative out-of-pocket premium on health plan choice will be modified by two factors: whether the employer offers tax-exempt employee-paid premiums under Section 125, and if so, the employee's marginal tax rate. We set a dummy variable (OFFER125) equal to 1 if the employer offers Section 125 and zero otherwise. The tax rate (TAXRATE) is measured at the state level and is the sum of the marginal federal income tax, state income tax and FICA tax rates averaged over all residents of the state (Lee, 1995). The tax rates observed in our data range from 29 to 53 percent (see the Appendix).
The effect of taxes is captured by creating a tax-adjusted relative premium (TARP) variable as follows:
[4] TARP = RLTVPREM -(RLTVPREM * OFFER125 * TAXRATE).
In theory, TARP is the correct premium variable for all employees in our data. For employees who are offered Section 125, TARP adjusts the relative out-of-pocket premium by one minus the tax rate. For employees who are not offered Section 125, the relative out-of-pocket premium remains unadjusted, because OFFER125 equals zero.
If employees are ignoring the effect of taxes, the effect of premiums should be captured fully by the variable RLTVPREM. The second term on the right-hand side of equation [4] should not explain any of the variance in the relative market share of the j th plan. The estimated version of equation [3] is:
where the L subscript indicates the lowest cost single and family coverage plans offered by an employer, and the X variables are non-price characteristics of health plans. Our test for the effect of taxes on the price elasticity of health plan choice among employees who are offered Section 125 is a test that β INTERACT is different from zero. In fact, we expect β INTERACT to be of the same magnitude as β PREM but of opposite sign (due to the negative sign on the last term).
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The results from this test can be used to compute the effect of tax-exempt out-ofpocket premiums on the elasticity of health plan choice. The own price elasticity of health plan choice is the percentage change in the j th plan's market share as the j th plan's out-of-pocket premium changes by 1 percent. For simplicity, we calculate elasticities for the market share of the j th plan relative to the lowest cost plan, or
The elasticity of this relative market share variable with respect to relative out-of-pocket premium (ε RLTVPREM ) is:
From equation [5] , the partial derivative of (MS j / MS L ) with respect to RLTVPREM j for employers not offering Section 125 (OFFER125 = 0) is:
and the elasticity is thus:
For employers who do offer Section 125 the elasticity is:
Holding RLTVPREM j constant, the percentage reduction in the out-of-pocket premium price elasticity of health plan choice with and without Section 125 is: [6] If β PREM = β INTERACT then the ratio equals the employee's marginal tax rate.
Exogeneity of Tax-adjusted Premiums
Our empirical tests could be subject to endogeneity bias. Endogeneity bias, in this case, refers to the possibility that some unobserved variables might influence both the tax-adjusted relative premium (TARP j ) and the dependent variable-the log of the relative market share of the j th
MS L
5 The sign on RLTVPREM should be negative, and the sign on RLTVPREM × TAXRATE × OFFER125 should be positive.
[ plan (LNMARKET j ). 6 Type 1 bias would arise if unobserved variables made it appear that consumers pay attention to the tax effects of Section 125 when, in fact, they do not. That could happen if unobserved variables caused the coefficient on the variable RLTVPREM × TAXRATE × OFFER125 to become positive and statistically significant.
For example, suppose that some employers have highly valued employees who have a preference for high-priced health plans. These might be older and more experienced employees. Those employers might be more likely to offer high-priced health plans (i.e., those with high values of RLTVPREM), and a disproportionately large number of employees might choose those highpriced plans. Furthermore, those employers might be more likely to offer Section 125, or to make higher premium contributions to higher cost plans, to reduce the out-of-pocket premiums of the highpriced plans that the highly valued employees prefer.
Because the TARP variable contains both RLTVPREM and OFFER125, it captures both potential sources of endogeneity: employer premium contributions and offering Section 125. We tested for the endogeneity of the TARP variables two ways. The first test was a standard Hausman test. 7 We rejected the hypothesis of endogeneity, but nonetheless estimated two-stage least squares (2SLS) models and compared the results to those from ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. The results of these analyses, found in the Appendix, show that the 2SLS results and the OLS results were similar. Second, we estimated a selectivity-corrected model that treated OFFER125 as an endogenous choice variable. The results, again found in the Appendix, show that the correction did not produce any meaningful change in the coefficients of interest. Finally, we include in the Appendix a table that compares the means of a number of observed variables for firms that do and do not offer taxexempt premiums. Tables 1 and 2 show the definitions, means, and standard deviations for all the variables in the analysis. Seventy-five percent of the employers offer tax-exempt employee premiums under Section 125, but eighty percent of the plans in the data are offered by employers that have Section 125. The descriptive statistics reveal the predominant characteristics of low cost plans. For example, the negative mean of RLTVHMO means that there is a tendency for the low cost plan to be an HMO, rather than a FFS, POS, or PPO plan. The lowest cost plans also tend to have relatively high coinsurance and deductibles.
RESULTS
We estimate separate market share (LNMARKET) equations for single and family coverage plans. The results are shown in Table 3 . Higher deductibles and coinsurance rates are associated with lower market share. Higher copayments have a weak negative effect, as well, in the single coverage equation. FFS health plans (the omitted health plan category) are strongly preferred to HMOs and POS plans, and somewhat preferred to PPO plans among employees choosing family coverage. Coverage of other services does 6 In addition, the levels of coverage offered by health plans are endogenous to the plans, perhaps with input from the employer and employees. The bias on the coverage coefficients almost certainly is positive, because unobserved employee preferences for particular types of coverage would be positively correlated with both the levels of observed coverage and the likelihood that employees choose plans offering higher levels of observed coverage. In this study, however, neither the size nor the statistical significance of the coefficients on the coverage variables are of particular interest. 7 Peter Kennedy (1998, page 151) provides a good explanation of this test. Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) discuss various forms of this test.
not have a strong effect on health plan market share. The primary variables of interest are RLTVPREM and the interaction of RLTVPREM with TAXRATE and OFFER125. Our results add to a growing body of evidence that employees are sensitive to the out-of-pocket premiums of the health plans offered by their employer. In both the single and family coverage equations, the main effect of RLTVPREM on relative market share is negative and highly significant.
As predicted by theory, the coefficients on the interaction terms have the opposite sign of the coefficient on RLTVPREM. The coefficients on the interaction terms in both the single and family coverage equations are significant at the 10 percent level-the effect for family coverage falling just outside the 5 percent level. LNMARKET the natural log of [P j /P L ] where P j and P L refer to the market shares of the j th health plan and the health plan with the lowest out-of-pocket premium, respectively. (Computed separately for single and family coverage plans.)
RLTVPREM
The employee's out of pocket premium for the j th health plan minus the out-of-pocket premium for the lowest cost plan of that coverage type (single or family)
TAXRATE
The sum of the marginal federal income tax, state income tax, and FICA tax rates averaged over all residents of the state OFFER125 = 1 if the employer offers tax-exempt out-of-pocket premiums under Section 125 and = 0, otherwise. with the expectation that β PREM equals β INTERACT . In fact, the ratio β INTERACT /β PREM , taken from Table 3 , is 1.40 for single coverage and 1.39 for family coverage. Thus, the empirical results suggest a percentage reduction that is even larger than that predicted by theory. The average tax rate in our data is approximately 40 percent. Our results indicate a percentage reduction in the range of 56 percent (1.4 × .4).
CONCLUSIONS
Our study examines the effect of taxexempt out-of-pocket health insurance premiums on health plan choice. Theory This analysis shows that tax-exempt out-of-pocket premiums distort the prices of competing health plans, contributing to inefficient allocation of health care resources. Conversely, repealing Section 125 could improve substantially the competitiveness of the market for health insurance in multiple health plan settings. Increased competition would produce more efficient levels of coverage and "amenities" (e.g., office waiting times, and time spent with providers) that affect premiums and enrollment in different health plans. However, it is unreasonable to expect employers to stop offering Section 125 unilaterally. Indeed, except for transactions costs, we would expect virtually all employers to offer Section 125 accounts. From the perspective of employers and employees, tax-exempt out-of-pocket premiums are a "free" benefit-financed by taxpayers in general.
There are two arguments in favor of subsidizing the out-of-pocket premiums for high-priced health plans in some manner. First, the premiums of competing health plans should reflect differences in coverage, "amenities," and efficiency, not differences in the health risk of their enrollees. Subsidies for high-priced plans might correct premium distortions arising from an uneven distribution of health risks among competing plans (Feldman, Dowd and Maciejewski, 2000) . Second, low-risk employees may view subsidies for high-priced plans as a form of insurance, protecting them from having to pay the full premium differential between high-and low-priced plans should they become high-risk and wish to join the plan preferred by high-risks (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1998) . These arguments in favor of some subsidy for high-priced plans do not justify the type of subsidy provided by Section 125. Because taxpayers pay for the Section 125 subsidy at no cost to employees, the result will be excessive levels of the subsidy and a loss of economic efficiency. In contrast, if employers install cross-plan subsidies by making larger contributions to highpriced health plans, then economic theory and the empirical studies of Gruber (1994) , Gruber and Krueger (1991), and Woodbury (1983) , suggest that workers will pay for the subsidy in the form of lower average wages. This type of subsidy would not lead to an efficiency loss.
Finally, Section 125, like the tax exemption of "employer-paid" health insurance premiums, is unquestionably regressive. It is worth far more to the wealthy, in higher personal income and wage tax brackets, than to the working poor. As a result it could be considered not only inefficient, but also unfair.
APPENDIX: EXOGENEITY TESTS FOR THE TAX-ADJUSTED RELATIVE PREMIUM VARIABLE
We tested for exogeneity of the tax-adjusted relative out-of-pocket premium variable (TARP), calculated according to equation [4] , using the Hausman (1978) test. The test was performed on the following equation:
The samples for single and family coverage were identical to those used for the primary analysis. As noted earlier, the TARP, in theory, is the correct premium for all subjects, and it contains all the potential sources of endogeneity found in our models with more complex treatment of the premium variable.
The reliability of the Hausman (1978) test depends on the quality of the "instruments,"-variables that affect TARP but are not correlated with the relative market share of the j th health plan. We identified four potential instruments: FAMLYPER = the percentage of employees enrolled in family versus single coverage plans; TOTPLANS = the total number of plans offered to employees; HILOPREM = the arithmetic difference between the highest and lowest premium of plans offered to employees; and TOTENROL = the total number of employees enrolled in all health plans.
These variables are all employer-level variables, rather than health plan level variables.
For that reason, they should difference away in the conditional logit form of our market share equation.
8 All four variables are indicators of
the diversity of employee preferences for different types of plans and could influence either the employer's contribution to premiums or the desire to shelter out-of-pocket premiums from taxes with Section 125. TOTPLANS is interesting for another reason. Our estimation procedure is based on the conditional logit model, which relies on the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The IIA assumption requires that the relative proportions of employees choosing any two plans should remain the same when a third plan is included or removed. A test of IIA in our data is that the log of the market share of the j th plan relative to the lowest cost plan (LNMARKET j ) is not affected by the total number of plans offered by the employer.
We perform two tests related to exogeneity. First, we test the quality of our instruments by including them in the LNMARKET equation with the TARP variable. A valid instrument should be statistically insignificant in that equation (Kennedy, 1998, p. 151) . In the single coverage model, TOTENROL and HILOPREM were significant at the 0.05 level, and thus were dropped as instruments. In the family coverage model, FAMLYPER and TOTENROL were significant at the 0.05 level, and were dropped as instruments. TOTPLANS was not significant in either equation, suggesting that the IIA assumption is met.
Next, we estimated an ordinary least squares (OLS) equation in which TARP is the dependent variable. The equation included all of the exogenous variables in the model, including the instruments. The instruments should be statistically significant in this equation. The Fstatistics for inclusion of these instruments in the TARP equation were significant at the 0.05 level for both single and family coverage.
Finally, we included the residuals from the OLS TARP equation as an explanatory variable, along with TARP, in OLS estimates of equation [6] . 9 The t-statistics for the OLS residuals were 1.293 (a = 0.20) in the single coverage equation and -0.057 (a = 0.95) in the family coverage equation. Thus, we reject the hypothesis of endo-geneity at the usual 0.05 level of significance.
Nonetheless, we estimated a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model in which TARP in the LNMARKET equation is replaced by the predicted value of TARP from the equation that includes the instruments as well as other predetermined variables in the model. The results are shown in the Table A1 .
The OLS and 2SLS coefficient results for family coverage are virtually identical. The 2SLS coefficient for single coverage actually is larger than the OLS coefficient, and its significance falls just outside the usual 0.05 level.
We also estimated a selectivity-corrected model using the Heckman-Lee method to correct for endogenous selection of Section 125 in the LNMARKET equation. In this analysis, we jointly estimate the LNMARKET equation and a probit equation for OFFER125 (i.e., the dependent variable equals one if the employer offers Section 125 and zero, otherwise). The explanatory variables in the probit equation are identical to those in the TARP equations described earlier, including the instruments. The LNMARKET equation is estimated only for the employers that offer Section 125. The selectivity-corrected coefficients are compared to the uncorrected coefficient on TARP from the same sample. They also can be compared to the coefficients for the full sample in Table A1 .
The rho (r) coefficient estimates the correlation of the error terms in the OFFER125 equation and the LNMARKET equation. Interestingly, the selectivity model identifies statistically significant selectivity in the family coverage equation, and yet the TARP coefficients are virtually unaffected by the correction. The negative estimate of r means that unobserved variables are associated with a higher probability of offering Section 125 and decreased demand for plans with high out-of-pocket premiums. This was the opposite of our hypothesis regarding unobserved variables.
Finally, we present data comparing firms that offer Section 125 to firms that don't, on a variety of measures. Only the total number of plans achieved statistical significance at the 0.05 level. The total number of plans should be different in the two samples, because it is an instrument in the TARP equation. 
